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Informal Rules, Transaction Costs, and the
Failure of the "Takings" Law in China
By CHENGLIN LIU*
Introduction'
On the morning of September 15, 2003, a man named Zhu Qingliang
poured a bottle of gasoline on himself and proceeded to light the gasoline
on fire. Instantly, he became a massive fireball, lighting up Beijing's
Tiananmen Square.2 Zhu's tragic demonstration was a protest against the
local government, which demolished his home without giving him proper
compensation. A similar case happened in Nanjing three weeks earlier.
There, a man named Weng immolated himself at the local demolition and
relocation office, which had forcefully evicted his family and demolished
his home without proper compensation.3 According to a report by Xie and
Chen, six deaths were attributed to a single demolition project in Beijing
running from January to April 2003. 4 On January 9, 2005, two residents in
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1. Presented at the 9th Annual Conference of the International Society of New
Institutional Economics (ISNIE), in Barcelona, Spain at Pompeu Fabra University from
Sept. 22-24, 2005.
2. Yan Xiaomei, Anhui Qingyang Xian Nongmin Zhu Zhengliang Ze Tiananmen Zifen
Diaocha [Report on Mr. Zhu's Immolation in the Tiananmen Square], DONGFANG ZAO BAO
[EAST MORNING NEWS], (Sept. 18, 2003), available at
<unn.people.com.cn/GB/1 4748/2095066.html>.
3. Wang Cijiang and Chengshi Chaiqian, Sifa Heyi Quewai [Urban Demolition: Lack
of Law and Order], CHINA NET, (Sept. 22, 2003), available at
<www.china.org.cn/chinese/law/408670.htm>.
4. Xie Guangfei & Chen Xiaofeng, Beijing Yeman Chaiqian Shyian Diaocha [A
Investigation on "Savage Eviction" in Beijing], ZHONGGUO JINGn SHIBAO [CHINA
EcONOMIC NEWS], (Nov. 5, 2003), available at
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Shanghai died in a fire deliberately set by a commercial developer
attempting to scare and evict residents from the building.
5
These tragedies were by no means isolated incidents. At the National
Conference on the Management of Urban Demolition and Relocation, the
Vice Minister of Construction revealed that similar incidents had resulted
in 26 deaths and 16 injuries from January 2002 to July 2002. From January
2002 to August 2002, the Ministry of Construction received 1,730 in-office
complaints, 70% of which concerned demolitions, and 123 group petitions,
83.7% of which concerned the same.6 A similar trend was reported by the
State Bureau of Letters and Visits.
7
The tremendous harm inflicted on private owners can be directly
related to China's furious economic development. Since the 1990s, China
has witnessed large-scale demolition projects aimed at making room for
commercial development.8 To cut costs and gain maximum returns,
commercial developers have been reluctant to provide residents with
compensation and relocation arrangements after demolishing old houses.
The tension between residents and developers has seriously affected social
stability. In order to strike a balance between economic development and
private property protection, the Chinese lawmakers passed several laws to
regulate government takings. In March 2004, a clause was added to Article
13 of the Constitution, which requires the government to compensate
private owners when their property is taken for public use. However, the
widespread misuse of "public purpose" takings and forced evictions
demonstrate that the newly-enacted rules'have failed to protect private
<www.china.org.cn/chinese/2003/Nov/435359.htm>.
5. Yang Jinzhi, Xu Shousong & Huang Tingjun, Shanghai Dongquian Shaosi Ren
Yi 'an [Arson Case in Shanghai Demolition and Relocation Project], XINHUA NET, (Aug. 24,
2005), available at <news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2005-08/24/content 3397043.htm>.
6. Liu Zhifeng Fubuzhang Ze Quanguo Chengshi Fangwu Chaiqian Gongzuo
Zhuotang Hui Shang de Jianghua [Vice Minister of Construction Liu Zhifeng's Speech at
National Conference of Urban Housing Demolition and Relocation, Sept. 3, 2002] [Vice
Minister Liu's speech was archived in the Ministry of Construction's website at
<www.cin.gov.cn/indus/speech/2002091601.htm> (visited July 22, 2005)]. The transcripts
of the conference are useful sources for studying how the government dealt with
confrontations between residents and developers in 2002. The entire transcripts are
available at <www.cin.gov.cn/meeting/02cq/default.htm>.
7. Niu Aimin, Anhui Nongmin Tiananmen Zifen Yuanyin Chamin: Chaiqian Jiufen
Yinqi [The Incident of Self Immolation in the Tiananmen Square was Caused by Disputes
Over Demolition], CHINA NET, (Sept. 17, 2003), available at
<www.china.org.cn/chinese/2003/Sep/405803.htm>.
8. Zhao Ling, Chaiqian Shinian Beixi Ju [Happy Endings Became Tragedies Over 10
Years], NANFANG ZHOUMO, (Apr. 14, 2004), available at
<house.focus.cn/fviewmsg/1 174/11266760.html>.
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owners.
The objective of this paper is to analyze why the enforcement of
China's new takings law has failed. Many Chinese scholars argue that
lackluster enforcement can be remedied by a well-drafted property code.
However, this paper applies the New Institutional Economics' (NIE) theory
on institutions to the enforcement failure associated with the takings law. It
draws attention to informal constraints, which may be the ultimate cause of
failure in enforcing China's takings law. Part I examines the basic theories
on government takings and the NIE's view on the relationship between
formal and informal constraints. Part II provides a detailed analysis of the
major informal constraints that are detrimental to the protection of private
property. Finally, this paper concludes that fundamental institutional
changes are needed in order to establish a functional body of property laws
in China. These changes will ultimately reduce transaction costs resulting
from China's economic development.
I. Government Takings and Transaction Costs
A. Justifications and Limitations of Government Takings (Eminent
Domain)
"Eminent domain is the power of the sovereign to take property for
'public use' without the owner's consent." 9 Even though the coercive use
of private property can be traced to the days of the Roman Empire, the term
"eminent domain" originated from Grotius' work De Jure Belli et Pacis in
the seventeenth century.10 Grotius believed the state possessed the power
to take or destroy property for the benefit of the social unit, but the state
was obligated to provide compensation to the property owner for the loss. 1
The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that no
private property can be taken for public use without just compensation.
12
9. 1 NICHOLS ON EMIENT DoMAIN §1.11 (Julius L. Sackman ed., 3d ed. 2004)
[hereinafter NICHOLS].
10. Id. at §1.12.
11. Id. at §1.12[1]:
[T]he property of subjects is under the eminent domain of the state, so that the
state or he who acts for it may use and even alienate and destroy such property, not
only in the case of extreme necessity, in which even private persons have a right
over the property of others, but for ends of public utility, to which ends those who
founded civil society must be supposed to have intended that private ends should
give way. But it is to be added that when this is done the state is bound to make
good the loss to those who lose their property.
12. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
This clause is often referred to as the "takings clause" or "eminent domain
clause." Eminent domain proceedings require that: (1) the property be put
to public use; and (2) the owner of the property be provided with just
compensation. 13
Property taken through eminent domain proceedings has to be for
public use according to law, even though the definition of "public use" is
subject to debate. 14  It does not mean that all for-public-use projects
automatically warrant invoking the power of eminent domain. If public
land is suitable for building a public school, it is not necessary to acquire
private property for the same purpose. Eminent domain proceedings are
often used in situations where land assembly involves a market failure on
the supply side. 15 For example, building a highway may require several
adjacent parcels of lands, which are owned by different owners. If the
government had no power to take the lands coercively, it would have to
negotiate with each of the owners. If a single owner refused to sell her land
to the government, the whole project would have to be scrapped. This
leverage enables private owners to "holdout," thus driving prices much
higher than their normal market value. This so-called "holdout" problem in
assembling land for public projects is analogous to monopolies in antitrust
law. 16
Eminent domain is designed to overcome the holdout problem as a
result of market failure. However, one should not assume that eminent
domain is cost-free. Sometimes, eminent domain is more costly than free-
market exchange. 17 According to Thomas W. Merrill, the administrative
costs associated with eminent domain in the United States include:
18
Costs to lobby the legislature to grant the power of eminent domain;
Procedural costs required by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and
state laws, "includ[ing] drafting and filing . . . formal judicial
complaint[s] and service of process on the owner;" 19 Costs associated
with professional appraisal services; Costs associated with the guarantee
of condemnees' rights, including public hearings on the condemnation's
legality and the amount of compensation required; and [i]f condemnees
13. THOMAS J. MICELI, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO LAW 215 (Stanford Economics
and Finance 2004).
14. See NICHOLS, supra note 29, at § 7.02 [1], for a discussion on what constitutes
"public use" or "public purpose."
15. MICELI, supra note 13, at 216.
16. Id.
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file lawsuits to block the project, the costs of a lengthy lawsuit.
20
To determine whether the use of eminent domain power is desirable, it
is necessary to weigh the administrative costs of eminent domain against
the transaction costs of market exchange.
B. NIE, Transaction Costs and Informal Rules
One of the New Institutional Economics' (NIE) primary concerns is
the interplay between transaction costs and institutions. 2' According to
Douglass C. North, institutions are the rules of the game in a society and
consequently provide the framework of incentives that shape economic,
political, and social organization. Institutions are composed of formal rules
(laws, constitutions, rules), informal constraints (conventions, codes of
conduct, norms of behavior), and the effectiveness of their enforcement.
Enforcement is carried out by third parties (law enforcement, social
ostracism), by second parties (retaliation), or by the first party (self-
imposed codes of conduct).22
Institutions, such as property rights, have a great impact on transaction
costs and thus on economic performance. "There is an intimate connection
between the institutions and technology employed; the efficiency of a
market is directly shaped by the institutional framework., 23 Well-defined
property rights provide certainty and encourage individual owners to
participate in market competition and secure the return of their investments.
An open and competitive market as a result of well-defined property rights
is a powerful force to reduce transaction costs. On the contrary, if property
rights are ill-defined, or not enforceable, individuals are less likely to make
efforts to pursue long-term investments.24 A good example of this
correlation is the experience of developing economies, which seek foreign
investment. A 1997 World Bank report indicated that "countries with
stable governments, predictable methods of changing laws, secure property
rights, and a strong judiciary saw higher investment and growth than
countries lacking these institutions. 25
20. Susette Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005).
21. DOUGLASS C. NORTH ET AL., THE FRONTIERS OF THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS
xvi. (John N. Drobak & John V.C. Nye eds., Academic Press 1997) [hereinafter Drobak].
22. Id. at 6.
23. Id.
24. See, RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA'S LONG MARCH TOWARD RULE OF LAW 453
(Cambridge University Press 2002).
25. Id. at 450 (quoting WORLD BANK, ENTERING THE 2 1s" CENTURY: WORLD
DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1999/2000 23 (1999)).
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For developing economies, the implication of the NIE theory is that
the first step to economic growth is to establish a well-defined and
enforceable property rights framework. During this process, developing
economies must be fully aware that while formal rules on property rights
are relatively easy to establish (chiefly through legal transplantation),
informal norms that create indirect property rights protections are not.
Concerning the relationship between formal and informal rules, North
pointed out that even in the most developed economies, formal rules only
account for a small portion of the constraints.26 On the other hand,
informal rules play an important role in shaping the general climate in
which property rights are enforced. North further observed that "[t]he
informal constraints that are culturally derived will not change immediately
in reaction to changes in the formal rules. As a result, the tension between
altered formal rules and the persisting informal constraints produces
outcomes that have important implications for the way economies
change. 27  Therefore, the effectiveness of property rights protections
depends not only on well-defined legal rules, but also on informal rules that
either constrain or motivate behavior.28
The task to build a functional system of property rights in China is,
therefore, an arduous one. Formal property laws, such as constitutional
provisions and property codes, may be easy to enact, but informal rules are
far beyond the lawmakers' control. The deep-rooted bias against private
ownership, a weak judiciary, the unrestricted powers of the government
and widespread corruption problems are among the various informal
constraints that render formal rules unenforceable. Part II of this paper
identifies several informal constraints that are harmful to the protection of
private property rights in the process of massive government takings.
II. Informal Rules that Contribute to the Failure of the Takings
Laws
A. Misuse of "Public Purpose"
In 2004, a new clause was imbedded in Article 13 of China's
Constitution. According to this new clause, private property may be
26. DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 36 (Cambridge University Press 1990).
27. Id. at 45.
28. LEE J. ALSTON, GARY D. LIBECAP, & BERNARDO MUELLER, Violence and the
Development of Property Rights to Land in the Brazilian Amazon, in Drobak, supra note 21,
at 145.
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expropriated or taken by the state, but the taking has to be for public use
and with compensation. 29 This amendment became instant good news to
residents who were struggling to keep their houses or wanted fair
compensation. There were reports that residents posted copies of the new
constitutional clause on their front doors to defend their homes. However,
the principle that the amendment set forth met harsh reality. Despite the
amendment, developers carried out demolitions for commercial
development as previously planned. Neither the People's Congress nor the
Supreme People's Court issued any interpretations on the meaning of
"public use." As a result, local governments simply took advantage of their
inherent powers to over-stretch the scope of "public use." Chinese scholars
analogized the term "public use" to a big "basket," into which local
governments threw every conceivable project. 30 The reasons for the misuse
of the "public purpose" are as follows.
1. GRC Doctrine
In the 1990s, several coastal cities created the GRC doctrine (Zhengfu
Jingying Chengshi), which means government officials run a municipality
in the same way a chief executive officer runs a large for-profit
corporation. The major goal of those cities was to attract foreign
investment and increase local GDP. The governments in the cities sold
urban land-use rights, together with utility supplies and infrastructures, to
foreign investors. The proceeds from land sales became the major source
of revenue. To maintain a competitive edge, these cities sold, to foreign
investors, the land in the best locations with built-in utility lines and access
to highways. In most cases, the best locations were in downtown
residential areas. To make the land readily available, the cities carried out
massive demolition and relocation. In order to maximize gains from the
land sales, the cities often lowered compensation standards and shortened
the time period for residents to seek remedies either through petition or
litigation. At the same time, the cities carried out public campaigns to
29. Article 13 of the Constitution of China [XIAN FA art. 13 (2004) P.R.C.] (amended as
of 2004) states:
The lawful private property of citizens may not be encroached upon. By law, the
state protects citizens' rights to own private property and the rights to inherit
private property. The state may, for the public interest, expropriate or take over
citizens' private property for public use, and pay compensation in accordance with
law.
30. Zhu Linxing, Qieshi Guifan Jiti Tudi Zhengshou Zhengyong Zhidu [Ways to
Improve Land Acquisition System], JIEFANG RIBAO [LIBERATION DAILY], (Jan. 24, 2005),
available at <www.jfdaily.com.cn/gb/node2/node4O85/node4O86/node6O38/
userobject 1 ai780651.html>.
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
persuade residents to make personal sacrifices in support of the decision to
revitalize the local economy.
Since the end of the 1990s, cities have become accustomed to selling
the best locations to foreign investors and commercial developers. The
GRC doctrine is widely adopted among local leaders throughout the
country. The major reason is that selling land to commercial developers is
the most expedient way to increase local GDP. In recent years, local GDP
has become an overwhelming standard for assessing the ability of the local
officials. Under the centralized system, the appointment to key posts of
local officials is decided by a level of government higher than local
constituencies. Consequently, the basic criteria for reappointment or
promotion is how well the local officials could implement orders from the
top, not how well they served the local people. As a result, local
governments have put their sole emphasis on economic growth and have
paid less attention to social issues, such as forced evictions. 31 In addition to
selling land for commercial development, local leaders found that engaging
"showcase projects" or "legacy projects" (Xingxiang Gongcheng), such as
building gigantic squares and widening streets, can also bring their cities
into the national spotlight. All of these showcase projects involve either
massive demolition of residential houses or the imposition of heavy taxes
on urban residents. 32
What happened in Jiahe illustrates how a local government can
aggressively engage in a demolition and relocation under the guise of a
"public project." The Jiahe incident was the first reported case after the
State Council issued an Urgent Notice, requiring the local government to
31. See CHENGLIN Liu, CHINESE LAW ON SARS (W.S. Hein Co. 2004). When SARS
broke out, local governments' first reaction was to assess how the disease would affect the
image of the local region and hurt the local economy. During a news conference,
Guangdong health officials told reporters that 305 SARS cases were not too many so they
did not think it was necessary to release the information. Apparently, the dollar value that
the local government put on people's health was far less than that of the protection of local
image and economic growth. Solving social problems that concern the local people most,
such as increasing input to the health care system, upgrading medical facilities, and
improving networks for screening infectious disease, is unlikely to gain officials credit for
promotion or reappointment, because the results of those efforts are intangible in an
economic sense.
32. Sui Guanzuo, Liaoning Pinkun Xian 800 Wan Xiu Huaohua Guangchang Yangbuqi
Caoping Gaizhong Xiaomai [An Undeveloped County Spent RMB 8 Million Building a
Luxury Square], BEIJING QtNGNiAN BAO [BEIJING YouTH DAILY], (Sept. 8, 2004), available
at <www.china.org.cn/chinese/2004/Sep/654970.htm>. In order to build a showcase, a poor
county in Liaoning Province invested RMB 8 million to build a huge square in the center of
the city. When the square was finished there was no fund left for planting grass so the
county leaders decided to grow wheat instead. To build the square, a People's Liberation
Army memorial site was demolished and relocated to a suburban area.
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focus on ordinary people's long-term interests and strike a balance between
pursuing economic growth and improving people's living standards.
Despite the strict rules placed on the national media,33 some devoted
journalists made great efforts to investigate the Jiahe case.34 A series of
investigative reports were circulated on the Internet and in national
newspapers.
In 2004, the Jiahe County government decided to build the Pearl
Spring Commercial Mall (Pearl Spring) in the center of the downtown area
in order to attract investment and improve the local economy. With the
government's full support, an overseas company obtained the no-bid
contract at a surprisingly low price-RMB 30 per square meter. 35  The
33. The Central Government quickly became aware of the social repercussions resulting
from massive demolition and relocation projects across China. On September 19, 2003, the
same week as Zhu's immolation protest, the State Council issued the Guanyu Renzhen
Zhuohao Chengzheng Fangwu Chaigian Gongzhuo Weihu Shehui Wending De Jinji
Tongzhi [An Urgent Notice on Diligently Carrying out Urban Housing
Demolition and Relocation, Maintaining Social Stability], Guoban fa ming
dian [2003] No. 42, (Sept. 19, 2003) available at
<www.southcn.com/news/china/china04/chaiqian/zyjs/200310220876.htm>. The Urgent
Notice (Jinji Tongzhi) is a type of normative document, which has no legally binding effect;
however, it can have a huge impact on local governments in a time of crisis. For example,
during the SARS epidemic in 2003, the State Council issued several influential urgent
notices urging local governments to take measures on prevention, control, and treatment of
the disease. See generally, Liu, supra note 31. The Urgent Notice acknowledged that some
condemners did not provide residents with proper compensation and relocation housing.
Some condemners used improper means to evict residents, causing bloody incidents, which
provoked a large number of residents to file class-action petitions with local governments
and even the central government. The Notice attributed the chaos to local governments'
lack of proper management over the demolition and relocation projects. It required that
local governments focus on ordinary people's long-term interests and strike a balance
between pursuing economic growth and improving people's living standards. It also urged
governments to act in accordance with the law. Even though the Notice emphasized
transparency and supervision, it laid out strict rules on what national media outlets should
report on issues arising from such projects. For example, it required the national media to
focus on achievements rather than problems with urban construction, to maintain a positive
tone and avoid exaggerating or intensifying the existing failures and problems. Although it
did not explicitly blame the media for reporting the above-mentioned tragedies, it sent a
strong message to all journalists as to what the government would expect from them.
34. The first intensive investigation of this case was released by Chinese Central TV.
Other news outlets reprinted this report and conducted their own investigations. Sina.com
and Sohu, two prominent websites, created their own special edition reports on the Jiahe
investigation. See generally Sina.com, available at
<news.sina.com.cn/z/hnjiahe/index.shtml>. China Internet News Center also has a
compilation of news sources called Facing Demolition, available at
<www.china.org.cn/chinese/zhuanti/dhcq/417954.htm> [hereinafter Jiahe Investigation].
35. Hunan Jiahe Chaiqian Diaocha 2: Yin Yang Hetong [Investigation Report on
Demolition and Relocation in Jiahe, Hunan Provice 2: Yin Yang Contract] (China Central
TV broadcast May 14, 2004), available at <news.sina.com.cn/c/2004-05-
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
whole project covered 120,000 square meters in an area where more than
7,000 residents lived in 1,100 residential units.
36
Cheap land deals do not necessarily satiate developers' greediness.
Once it comes to demolition, relocation and compensation, the developers
are extremely tight-fisted. In Jiahe, the developer's registered capital was
only RMB 10 million, while the required budget of the project was well
over RMB 1 billion.37 The inadequate funding for the project meant that it
was impossible for the developer to properly compensate the affected
residents. The county government was fully aware of the difficulties it
would face in carrying out the demolition and relocation work. Therefore,
the government utilized all the powers at its disposal to clear the way for
commercial development.
After selling the land, the Jiahe County government launched a series
of propaganda campaigns. Red banners flew over major streets saying,
"[t]hose who are against the Pearl Spring project for a few days will be
affected by the county government for a lifetime. 38 During a countywide
meeting, the secretary of the political and legal committee shouted that
those who were against the project were counter-revolutionaries, 39 a radical
term used in the Cultural Revolution of 1966.40 By using such radical
terms, the county leader tried to turn compensation disputes into a political
issue. All residents affected by the project had to sacrifice personal
interests for the "common good" of the county.
On August 7, 2003, the Jiahe County Communist Party Commission
and People's Government jointly issued a normative document-Jie Ban
[2003] Notice No. 136 (Notice 136), which required that all county
employees make four guarantees:
14/11203228616.shtml>.
36. Yangshi <<Shehui Jilu>>: Hunan Jiahe Chaiqian Zhi Tong [China Central
Television Station Investigation: The Pain of Jiahe Demolition] (China Central TV
Broadcast May 26, 2004), available at <news.sina.com.cn/c/2004-05-
26/10553336990.shtml>.
37. Zeng Pengyu, Hunan Jiahe Beibu Chaiqian Hu Huode Guojia Peichang Meiren
Yue RMB 1700 [Condemnees who were Arrested During Demolition Received State
Compensation in the Amount of RMB 1, 700/per person], BEIJING QINGNIAN BAO [BEIJING
YOUTH DAILY], (June 28, 2004), available at
<news.sohu.com/2004/06/02/28/news220352857.shtml>.
38. See Jiahe Investigation, supra note 34.
39. Id.
40. In Cultural Revolution era (1966-1976), "counter-revolutionary" was the most
threatening term. Persons officially put into this category faced public humiliation, torture,
labor camps, and their families were socially isolated by the community. Around 30 million
"counter-revolutionaries" died during the Cultural Revolution.
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To persuade family members (family members includes extended family
members) 41 to accept the official appraisal within the time limit;
To persuade family members to sign the demolition, relocation and
compensation agreements;
To persuade family members to hand in all necessary housing certificates
and assist with relocation; and
To prevent family members from obstructing the demolition process,
participating in class-action suits, or filing petitions with higher levels of
government.
For those who failed to fulfill the above guarantees, their jobs and
salaries were to be suspended. Employees who did not prevent their
relatives from obstructing demolition and relocation projects were to be
dismissed or sent to remote areas to work.42
Even though Notice 136 was nonsensical, officials in Jiahe faithfully
enforced it. Some 160 county employees were officially told to guarantee
that their relatives move out of the demolition zone within the time limit set
by the government. A number of employees were either dismissed or
transferred to the countryside for failing to persuade their family members
in this way. As a result of such practices, on the same day, two sisters
divorced their husbands in protest. Mr. Li, their father, owned a four-story
building along the busiest street in Jiahe that was designated as part of the
demolition zone. Due to its ideal location, Mr. Li turned the first floor into
profitable shops. Not satisfied with the low compensation given him, Mr.
Li refused to sign the deal and vacate the building. Because both his
daughters' husbands were county employees, they were obligated to
guarantee their father-in-law would move out of the demolition zone. The
sisters hoped that their divorces would save their husbands' jobs.
However, the divorce strategy did not work. Further, because the sisters
were English teachers they were also considered county employees. Soon
after their divorces, the sisters were notified that they were to be transferred
to schools in remote areas. The government believed that the two sisters
deserved demotions because they had set bad examples by deliberately
avoiding their responsibility to facilitate the Pearl Spring project.
In addition, the county government mobilized a large number of the
police force and judicial officers to deal with the "holdouts." On April 24,
2004, when the government carried out a forced eviction, an old couple
41. See Jiahe Investigation, supra note 34.
42. Id.
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
stood on the roof and refused to move. The couple was arrested by the
Jiahe police on charges of resisting official eviction and disturbing public
order. The couple was held in prison for 17 days until the State Council
Investigation Team intervened. However, the county police refused to
admit any misconduct.43
2. Unenforceable Zoning Law
Among other factors, an unenforceable zoning law is attributed to
local officials having unlimited power to authorize massive demolition and
relocation projects.4 4 The Urban Zoning Law (UZL) was passed in 1989
and took effect in 1990. The objective of the UZL is to ration limited land
resources in urban areas. The law requires the State Council to draw a plan
for national land use and local governments to draw respective plans for
local development. Pursuant to the UZL, a local land-use plan is subject to
two levels of approval. First, the plan should be submitted to the local
people's congress for approval. Second, the local government should send
the plan to a higher level of government for approval. Large cities with a
population of over ten million should submit their land-use plans to the
State Council. The reporting and approval requirement is used to institute a
system of checks and balances. However, the system fails to achieve its
intended result, mostly because the law does not specify legal liabilities for
those government officials who fail to observe city planning. Furthermore,
because China does not have a separation of powers system, the local
people's congress is a branch of government, rather than an independent
political entity, which is vested with the power to exercise effective
supervision over the government.
Consequently, like any other law designed to impose constraints on
the government, the UZL became unenforceable as soon as it was
promulgated. A high official from the Ministry of Construction admitted,
"[s]ome cities do not have a zoning plan, or if there is one, it is not
enforced at all. In those cities, normative documents from the local
government take precedence over zoning plans. ' 45 In April 1999, in an
43. See Zeng, supra note 37. Under pressure from the national media and the Central
Government, the police released Mr. Li and his wife and paid RMB 1,700 per person as
compensation for lost salary.
44. Chaiqian Jiufen Benke Bimian Chengshi Guihua Ying Zhuzhong Baohu Gongquan
[Disputes Over Demolition is Avoidable if Urban Zoning Plan Embraces Public Input],
ZHONGGUO GONGSHANG SHIBAO [CHINA INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE DAILY], (Nov. 16,
2004), available at <www.bjhouse.com/xwpd/dczx/2004111695404.htm>.
45. Fu Bochang, Jianshe Bu Zhuzai Si Fu Si Zhang Jiedu Chengshi Fangwu Chaiqian
Guiu [Official of the Construction Ministry Explains Rules on Demolition], RENMIN RIBAO
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effort to enforce the UZL, the State Council promulgated the Outline of
National Land Use Plan (1997-2010) (Outline), which set land use quotas
for local governments. However, the Outline has been largely ignored by
local governments. Some wealthy provinces used up land quotas at an
enormous speed. By 2004, Shandong province had used up 80% of its land
quotas. Jiangsu province used almost its entire quota six years ahead of
schedule.46  Some Chinese scholars observe that city planning is like a
scribble on a local leader's drawing board-it can be easily changed
according to city leaders' preferences.47
Without taking the zoning law into consideration and being
accountable to the local congress, local leaders have the freedom to
authorize new development projects at will. As previously discussed, in
order to increase their chances of being promoted or reappointed, local
leaders are eager to engage in so-called "showcase" or "legacy" projects.
Because it is considered politically unwise to continue a predecessor's
project, most projects start when a new leader takes office and end when he
leaves office. As a result, city development is often in a state of
uncertainty. Even though the 2001 Regulations provide that the
Demolition Bureaus should abide by local city planning and applicants
should submit zoning certificates, among other documents, in order to
obtain a demolition license,48 neither the Demolition Bureau nor the
applicants take this provision seriously. It takes only a special note or
phone call from high officials to set aside this requirement.49
The following case illustrates how volatile a zoning plan can be in a
well-developed metropolitan area. 50 On March 26, 2005, 80 owners of an
apartment complex in Wuhan, the capital of Hubei Province, suddenly
[PEOPLE'S DAILY], (July 23, 2004), available at <big5.china.com.cn/chinese/2004/
Jul/617397.htm>.
46. Wang Libin, Tudi Guihua Geng zhe "Shui " Ze Zou? [Forces Behind Zoning Plan],
XINHUA NET, (May 12, 2004), available at <news.xinhuanet.com/
house/2004-05/12/content1464972.htm>.
47. ZHANG QINHUA, ZHONGGUO TUDIFA CAOZUO SHIWU [PRACTICAL MANUAL OF CHINA
LAND LAW] 194 (Law Press China 2d ed. 2004).
48. GuowuYuAN FAZHIBAN NONGYIE ZIYUAN HUANBAO FAZHI SI [THE STATE COUNCIL
AGRICULTURAL RESOURCES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION BUREAU, ET AL], CHENGSHI
FANGWU CHAIQIAN GUANLI TIAOLI SHIYI [THE INTERPRETATIONS OF THE REGULATIONS ON
URBAN HOUSING DEMOLITION AND REMOVAL] art. 7, at 120, (Zhishi Chubanshe [Knowlegde
Press] 2004) [hereinafter INTERPRETATIONS].
49. WANG CAILIANG, FANGWU CHAIQIAN JIUFEN JIAODIAN SH1YI [GUIDE TO SOLVING
DISPUTES OVER URBAN HOUSING DEMOLITION] 18-19 (Law Press China 2004).
50. Xifang Queyao Chaiqian! [Demolishing New Houses!], XINLANG WUHAN
FANGCHAN [XINLANG WUHAN REAL ESTATE], (Apr. 19, 2005), available at
<wh.house.sina.com.cn/sye/fcbgt/2005-04-19/15098181 .html>.
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received an eviction notice stating that their apartment building was in the
redevelopment zone and would be demolished. The owners were shocked
by the eviction order because the building was recently built in 2002. All
the owners had official documents to prove their ownership, which
included the building authorization certificate issued by the City Zoning
Office. The owners did not receive any information about the rezoning
until they noticed eviction orders posted on their front doors.
3. Corruption
Bribes from land sale deals account for a major source of corruption,
which is a widespread problem in China. The estimated loss of revenue
from the nationwide sale of state-owned lands reaches hundreds of billions
of RMB each year.5 ' In recent years, foreign countries have become safe
havens for corrupt Chinese officials. The exact number of officials who
have fled overseas with state money is not clear. In 2004, the Ministry of
Public Security estimated that some 500 corrupt officials had fled China
with state property totaling approximately RMB 70 billion ($8.45 billion).52
The close relationship between commercial developers and
government officials is an open secret. While there is no clear indicator of
which-developers or government officials-is first to reach out to the
other, one thing is certain, developers cannot make a profit without
government support. The local government is the sole entity entrusted to
manage and sell state-owned land. The local government has the power to
promulgate and enforce city-zoning plans and approve urban construction.
If the construction involves demolition and relocation, the developers must
seek approval from the government. The government also decides how the
developers will compensate residents, and adjudicate disputes. Finally, the
government has the power to authorize forced evictions. However, this
does not mean that developers have nothing to offer the government in
return. Under the current political system, local officials are appointed by
higher levels of government. The officials are evaluated on how well they
promote the local economy.53 In order to pursue higher growth, local
leaders have made great efforts turning old city districts into shopping
51. See ZHANG QINHUA, supra note 47, at 51.
52. Woguo Muqian Waitao Jingii Fanzui Xianyi Ren 500 Duo, She 'an Jin 'e 700 Yi
[China Currently has 500 Suspects Fleeing Abroad with RMB 70 billion], RENM1NG RIBAO
[PEOPLE'S DAILY], (Sept. 10, 2004), available at <news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2004-
09/10/content 1964988.htm>.
53. DANIEL C.K. CHOW, THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN A
NUTSHELL 439 (Thomson West 2003).
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malls and drawing foreign investments.5a Commercial developers are
essential to the carrying-out of leaders' political ambitions. Close
relationships between local leaders and commercial developers are
mutually beneficial.55  Without a system of checks and balances, these
kinds of relationships are tainted with corruption. 56 Developers offer huge
gifts to local officials in order to purchase land at extremely low prices and
gain government's full backing for forced evictions.
B. Lack of Compensation
Grossly inadequate compensation was the major source of
confrontation between developers and residents. Having realized this
problem, the Ministry of Construction issued the Guiding Opinions on the
Appraisal of Urban Housing Demolition (Opinions) on December 1, 2003,
which took effect on January 1, 2004. The Opinions 57 set forth detailed
guidelines on the procedure to conduct appraisals of urban housing.
1. Government Price Listing v. Market Value
The major difference the Opinions have made is that all demolition
appraisals must be based on the market value of affected houses, rather
than the replacement value at the time the houses were built. While this
change has been hailed as a fundamental step towards fair compensation,
the Opinions fail to take the opportunity to clarify this market value-
oriented approach. Instead, the Opinions lay out two parallel benchmarks
for appraisal-the prices annually announced by the government and the
prices indicated by the real-estate market. As to which benchmark carries
more weight and how to deal with situations where a considerable
discrepancy between the two benchmark prices occurs, the Opinions offer
no guidance. Scholars have questioned the credibility of the official prices
announced by the government.58 It is not a novel requirement that
governments publish housing market prices. Article 32 of the Law on the
54. See Xingxiang Gongcheng Baihuai Xingxiang [Legacy projects smeared image],
XINHUA NET, (July 14, 2004), available at <news.xinhuanet.com/forum/2004-07/14/
content_1596024.htm>, for a detailed discussion about legacy projects.
55. See ZHANG QINHUA, supra note 47, at 51.
56. Id.
57. Chengshi Fangwu Chaiqian Gujia Zhidao Yijian [Guiding Opinions on the
Appraisal of Urban Housing Demolition] [hereinafter Opinions]. The Opinions were
included in XINBIAN CHENGSHI FANGwu CHAIQIAN SHIYONG ZHINAN [PRACTICAL GUIDE TO
URBAN HOUSING DEMOLITION (NEw COMPILATION)] 135-139 (Dang Bo & Bai Zhanfeng
eds., Zhongguo Minzhu Fazhi Chuben She [China Democracy and Law Press] 2005)
[hereinafter PRACTicAL GUIDE].
58. See WANG CAILIANG, supra note 49, at 69.
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Management of Urban Real Estate in the PRC (1994) (Urban Real Estate
Law) provides that housing replacement prices be published periodically.
However, local governments do not take this provision seriously. In Mr.
Weng's case, the only available government price listing, on which the
compensation was based, was outdated by five years.59 It is doubtful that
the local governments will be able to keep up with the volatile real estate
market.
According to experts, a list of market prices of urban housing is more
complex to compile than the replacement value list mandated by the Urban
Real Estate Law.6 ° While the easier one has not been kept up to date, it is
unrealistic to expect that the complex list could be compiled objectively
and timely. In addition, who should be responsible for the financial cost of
the compilation? Furthermore, the Opinions were promulgated by the
Ministry of Construction, which is at the same administrative rank as local
governments. As a result, the effectiveness of the requirement for
publishing housing prices is largely undermined because local governments
often ignore administrative orders from the Ministries.
Taking one step back, suppose that the local governments overcome
all the hurdles and publish the price list of urban housing annually,
questions still remain. If there is a housing market free from government
interference, it is meaningless to maintain a government price list
independent of the data from the market. Fair market value should be "the
amount of money which a purchaser willing, but not obliged, to buy the
property would pay to an owner willing, but not obliged, to sell it," taking
into consideration other factors. 61 Therefore, the information should come
from the marketplace, not from the government. In practice, the Opinions
give the local government too much leeway to manipulate the market price
in favor of the developers.62 The provision mandating government price
59. Ju Jing, Jiujing Shi Shenmo Yuanyin Daozhi le Canhuo de Fasheng [What Caused
Those Tragedies?] WAITAN HUA BAO [SHANG HAI WAITAN NEWS], (Sept. 3, 2003),
available at <news.sina.com.cn/c/2003-09-03/11041667135.shtml>; Yang Jiang, Yieman
Chaiqian Niangcheng Canhuo, Nanjing Chaiqian Hu "Zifen " Shyian [Salvage Demolition
Caused Deadly Incident: A Condemnee Set Himself on Fire], DAHE BAO [BIG RIVER DAILY],
(Sept. 1, 2003), available at <news.sina.com.cn/w/2003-09-01/0601666041 s.shtml>.
60. Yang Jinsong, Tiantao Chengshi Fangwu Chaiqian Buchang Jiage Chaozuo Moshi
[Study on an Operational Model of Urban Housing Demolition Appraisal], ZHONGGUO
FANGDICHAN PINGGU SHI [JOURNAL OF CHINA REAL ESTATE APPRAISERS], Mar. 19, 2004
(analyzing what constitutes real-estate market prices).
61. See NICHOLS, supra note 9, at 12.02 [1], at 12-60 to 12-67. "Fair market value"
means the amount of money which a purchaser willing, but not obliged, to buy the property
would pay to an owner willing, but not obliged, to sell it, taking into consideration all uses
for which the land was suited and might be applied.
62. See WANG CAILIANG, supra note 49, at 18 (analyzing why local governments tend
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lists reflects the notion that the lawmakers are still under the shadow of a
planned economy. One expert accurately pointed out that the government
price listings have substantially suppressed the appraisers' most important
function as determiners of market price. As their hands are tied by the
official price listings, the appraisers' job is reduced to simply applying
predefined formulas and benchmark prices in calculating compensations.63




Besides the problems caused by government price listings, the
impartiality of the appraisers has also been called into question.
65
According to the Opinions, the selection of an appraisal firm occurs either
through residential voting or by drawing lots. This provision seems to
warrant an open and transparent environment in appraiser selection.
However, the Opinions also provide that choices can only be made among
appraisers that are recommended by the city or county real-estate bureaus.
The bureaus' endorsement is, therefore, crucial for appraisal firms to stay
in business. In order to be on the list, appraisal firms are vying for the
favor of the bureaus, which also authorize condemnations. Consequently,
no matter how open the selection process is, the end result will not ensure
the impartiality of the appraisers. The reason is that the appraisers are
susceptible to the pressure exerted by the real-estate bureaus and the
developers.66 In addition, since demolitions are usually carried out in large
scales,67 it would be nearly impossible to have effective communication
among residents. In China, concerted efforts to protect private properties
are rare. Individual residents are reluctant to rally neighbors to conduct
background checks of the listed firms. The final choice of appraisers will
to side with developers).
63. See Yang Jinsong, supra note 60.
64. Id.
65. Wang Da, Chengshi fangwu Chaiqian Gujia Wenti Tiansou [A Study on Urban
Housing Demolition Appraisal], ZHONGGUO FANGDICHAN PINGGU SHI [JOURNAL OF
CHINA REAL ESTATE APPRAISERS], (Aug. 4, 2004), available at
<www.zgpg.net/show.aspx?id=3786&cid=3 >.
66. Id.
67. Guo, Zhongkui, Nie, Qibo & Li, Guoqing, Shi Lun Fangwu Chaiqian de Shichang
Jiage Pinggu Fang/a [Comments on the Methods in Defining Market Value in Urban
Housing Demolition Appraisal], ZHONGGUO FANGDICHAN PINGGU SHI [JOURNAL OF
CHINA REAL ESTATE APPRAISERS], (Aug. 4, 2004), available at
<www.zgpg.net/show.aspx?id=3783&cid=31>. For example, in 2003, there were 115
projects involving 179 square meters, 24,000 households in Nanjing.
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be invariably favorable to the developers.
The impartiality of appraisers is also affected by the lack of an
effective review process. According to the Opinions, unsatisfied residents
can appeal the appraisal results only twice. The first review is conducted
by the original firm or a new firm. The final review is conducted by an
expert committee. However, the Opinions are not clear about the expert
committees' composition. According to the wording of the Opinions, the
expert committees are ad hoc in nature. The committees consist of
appraisers, who hold full-time appointments in the government. Therefore,
the independence of the expert committees is not guaranteed.
The problem has been further exacerbated by the lack of serious legal
liabilities for appraiser misconduct.68 As stated in the previous section, in
relation to other rules and regulations, legal sanctions offered by the
Opinions are extremely lenient. For example, if an appraiser is found to
have conspired with developers with an intent to cause damage to the
residents, the appraiser is fined less than RMB 30,000 ($3,600). This small
fine cannot serve as a deterrent, as appraisers can receive much higher
commissions from massive demolition projects, which usually involve
hundreds of millions of RMB.
68. See Opinions, supra note 57. Legal liabilities for appraisal firms or appraisers are
laid out in Article 27 of the Opinions. The punishable acts include: issuing false appraisal
reports, conspiring with developers causing damage to residents, obtaining appraisal
projects by illegal means (such as offering kickbacks), allowing others to engage in
demolition appraisal projects using their names, transferring appraisal projects to others
under disguise, or repeatedly being reviewed and found incorrect or in violation of the
Standards of Real Estate Appraisal and other regulations. However, the Opinions do not
prescribe corresponding legal responsibilities for each of the above acts. Instead, the
Opinions refer to other laws and regulations: The Regulations on the Management of Urban
Housing Real Estate Agents (2001), the Measures on the Management of the Registration of
Real Estate Appraisers (2001), and the Criminal Law (1996). Because the wording of the
Opinions does not exactly square with the relevant clauses in other laws, it is disappointing
that the liabilities for illegal acts in the Opinions are not clear. After comparing the three
pieces of laws and regulations with the Opinions, the responsibilities can be summarized as
follows: (1) if an appraiser has intentionally decreased or increased appraisal value causing
direct economic damage to relevant parties, or allowed others to practice appraisal under his
name, the appraiser should be administratively admonished and may be fined in the amount
of not more than 3 times the amount of the illegal gains, but not more than RMB 30,000; (2)
if the appraiser's illegal gains have been confiscated, the fine should not exceed RMB
10,000; (3) if an appraiser has conspired with one of the parties with intent to cause damage
to the opposite party, or allowed other persons to practice appraisal under the appraiser's
name, the appraiser's license will be revoked and the appraiser will be fined not less than
RMB 10,000, but not more than RMB 30,000; and (4) if the circumstances are serious, the
appraiser will be investigated according to the Criminal Law.
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C. Lack of Due Process
1. Short Notice
After granting demolition, the Demolition Bureau is required to make
a public announcement of its decision regarding the name of the licensed
developer, and the scope and duration of the demolition. In addition, the
Demolition Bureau and the licensed developer are obligated to inform
affected residents of the demolition project and offer an explanation of the
nature of the project. 69  The purpose of this provision is to increase
transparency and reduce confusion and confrontation. However, this
requirement is more of a recommendation than a legal provision, because
there is no legal penalty if a Demolition Bureau or a demolition unit fails to
abide by it.70 Among the local rules enacted to implement the Regulations,
very few require a time period for the announcement. The Nanjing rules
provide that upon receiving a license for demolition, the demolition unit
should publicly announce the decision to the affected region 30 days before
carrying out the demolition.71
In practice, the requirement for communicating with residents is
largely ignored by many Demolition Bureaus and developers. For
developers, it is crucial to keep the announcement period as short as
possible. The reason is that a longer period will enable residents to
communicate with each other and to take collective action against the
project, which increases costs. Consequently, cases, such as that which
happened in Tianjin, are not uncommon. After returning from a vacation in
April 2004, a man named Mr. Wang was surprised to see that his Tianjin
neighborhood, where he owned one of the 2,000 residential units, had been
leveled to the ground. He could not even identify where his house formerly
stood. According to a former neighbor, the court posted an eviction order
on the front door of Mr. Wang's house on April 16, 2004. The next day,
the house was completely demolished. In the same neighborhood, Mr.
Zhang had no chance to remove his belongings before his house was
demolished. Mr. Zhang's family had to live in public baths, schools, and
even on the streets. Some demolitions were even more dramatic. After
sending his daughter to school in the morning, Mr. Chen found his house
flattened in the afternoon. His belongings and cash had also disappeared.
72
69. See INTERPRETATIONS, supra note 48, art. 8, at 120.
70. See id. at ch. 4: 123-24.
71. See art 8, Nanjing Chengshi Fangwu Chaiqian Guanli Tiaoli [Nanjing Rules on
Urban Housing Demolition and Relocations], in PRACTICAL GUIDE, supra note 57, at 355.
72. Li Xingling, Qiangzhi Chaiqian Fangzhu Jing Buzhi [Forced Eviction Carried Out
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2. Forced Agreements
After being granted a license for demolition, the next step for the
developer is to enter agreements with residents on the method and amount
of compensation, place of relocation, duration of relocation, and
transitional period.73 According to Article 16 of the Regulations, the
Demolition Bureau is the only entity that may arbitrate disputes between
residents and developers with regard to compensation and resettlement.
Most residents distrust the Demolition Bureau as an impartial arbitrator.
The obvious reason is that the Demolition Bureau has already examined
and approved the compensation standard and resettlement plan in the
process of granting the demolition license to the developer. It is unlikely
that the Demolition Bureau would rule against its own decision. In
addition, as a regular department, the Demolition Bureau leaders are
beholden to the government for their appointments and promotions. It is
impossible for the Demolition Bureau to be immune from external
interferences, especially from government officials who have close ties to
developers. According to a 2001 survey of five cities, conducted by a
Chinese scholar, the odds of a resident winning an arbitration adjudicated
by a Demolition Bureau was one in thirty-seven. 4
In order to restore public trust in the Demolition Bureau and maintain
social stability, the Ministry of Construction enacted the "Administrative
Arbitration Procedure for Adjudicating Disputes Arising from Urban
Housing Demolition (Arbitration Procedure),"7 5 which took effect on
March 1, 2004. The Arbitration Procedure spells out new requirements in
the arbitration process. For example, a public hearing should be held if a
large proportion of residents refuse to agree with a compensation
package,76 and developers are forbidden to enforce eviction orders by
cutting water and electricity. 7 However, there are no new measures in the
procedure to guarantee the impartiality of the Demolition Bureau, which is
the key to rendering a fair decision. Therefore, the Arbitration Procedure
has not substantially altered the imbalance between private owners and
Without Owners' Notice], ZHONGGUO QINAN BAO [CHINA YOUTH DAILY], (May 14, 2004),
available at <zqb.cyol.con/gb/zqb/2004-05/14/content_869728.htm>.
73. See INTERPRETATIONS, supra note 48, art. 13, at 121.
74. See WANG CAILIANG, supra note 49, at 100.
75. MINISTRY OF CONSTRUCTION, CHENGSHI FANGWU CHAIQIAN XINGZHENG CAIJUE
GONGCHENG [ARBITRATION PROCEDURE] (Dec. 30, 2003, effective Mar. 1, 2004), in
INTERPRETATIONS, supra note 48, at 200-04 [hereinafter ARBITRATION PROCEDURE].
76. Id. at 201.
77. Id. at 204.
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commercial development.78 The chances of a resident winning arbitration
before the Demolition Bureau remains slim.
3. Forced Eviction
For residents, losing to developers in Demolition Bureau arbitration is
disastrous. Even though residents may choose other channels to challenge
a Demolition Bureau's arbitration decision, they have to deal with an
immediate forced eviction by the winning developer with the Demolition
Bureau's backing, or sometimes even with judicial force. According to
Article 16(2) of the Regulations, if either of the two parties is not satisfied
with the Demolition Bureau's decision, the unsatisfied party (in almost all
cases the unsatisfied party is the resident) may appeal the Demolition
Bureau's decision to the People's Court. However, the Demolition
Bureau's decision is enforceable while the case is pending before the
court. 79 This means that even if residents win their case in court, their only
remedy is monetary damages. Regardless of whether the demolition
project is for a real public purpose, or for commercial development,
injunctive relief has never been an option.
During the execution of forced eviction orders, cutting off water and
electricity, verbally threatening residents, physically assaulting residents,
and sending thieves around to break into homes, are among the various
means utilized by condemners to drive residents away. Violence eviction
(also called savage eviction) has deeply affected people's lives and resulted
in social unease. A chilling news report, regarding how a family was
forcefully evicted, was published in the China Economic News80 and was
subsequently reprinted in other news sources across China. At midnight on
September 19, 2003, five people smashed windows and broke into Mr.
Wang's apartment. The men brandished large sticks, used a torch to blind
Wang's eyes and told the family not to make any noise. Wang, his wife,
and their nine-year-old son, were forced to the ground. After badly beating
the family, the men tied up their legs and hands, put blindfolds over their
78. Tang Yan, Chaiqian Xu Pingheng Siren Yu Gonggong Liyi Chaiqian Zhengdi Jidai
Lifa [It is Necessary to Strike a Balance Between Private Property and Public Interests in
the Process of Demolition; Law on Condemnation and Land Acquisition is Needed],
ZHONGGUO QINGNIAN BAO [CHINA YouTH DAILY], (Jan. 12, 2004), available at
<www.china.com.cn/chinese/zhuanti/dhcq/478124.htm>.
79. See INTERPRETATIONS, supra note 48, art. 16(2), at 121.
80. Wang Xiaoxia, Huanyi Baoli Chaiqian, Beijing yi Jumin Zao Kunbang Mengmian
Fangwu Beichai [Suspected Violent Eviction, After a Resident in Beijing was Tied up and
Blindfolded, His House was Demolished], ZHONGGUO JINGJI SHIBAO [CHINA EcONOMIC
NEWS], (Sept. 24, 2003), available at <www.china.org.cn/chinese/zhuanti/
dhcq/418519.htm>.
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eyes, gagged them with cloth, and threw them outside. A few minutes
later, some 20 to 30 men showed up at the building with a huge bulldozer.
While Wang and his family were lying on the ground terrified in the chilly
night, his apartment building was leveled to the ground. The group of men
quickly left the scene. Wang and his family were finally rescued by a
garbage collector. After sending his son to a relative's house, Wang called
the police. To his surprise, the police would not confirm that this was even
a crime. Strangely enough, this happened only 300 meters away from the
district government and police station in Haidian, a northwest district of
Beijing.
4. Lack of Remedies
When faced with a forced eviction order, residents have two channels
to challenge it, within three months of receiving it.81 The first is to file a
petition with the government for administrative reconsideration of the
order. If residents are not satisfied with the result of administrative
consideration, they can appeal the case to the government at a higher level
for further administrative reconsideration or to the court for administrative
adjudication. The other is to take the case directly to the court.82 If
residents are not satisfied with the court's decision, they may appeal the
case to a higher court. Whether residents can receive fair reconsideration
or adjudication for their cases depends on whether the administrative
review board or court is independent and competent. Because
administrative law in China is a new area in which much work needs to be
done, winning an administrative reconsideration or litigation is extremely
difficult.
Administrative reconsideration is carried out within the government
structure. The purpose of administrative reconsideration is "to prevent or
rectify illegal or inappropriate administrative actions and safeguard
citizens, legal persons, and other organizations' lawful interests. 83
However, administrative reconsideration has not proved an effective means
for residents to challenge forced eviction orders for two reasons. First, the
Administrative Reconsideration Law (ARL) does not require that an
independent review body be set up to handle administrative reconsideration
cases. As a result, the responsible entity for reviewing Demolition Bureau
decisions is usually a part of the land administration bureau, which
81. See ARBITRATION PROCEDURE, supra note 75, art. 16.
82. XINGZHENG FUYI FA [ADMINIsTRATIVE RECONSIDERATION LAW (P.R.C.)], art. 15, 16,
available at <www.molss.gov.cn/correlate/xzfyF.htm>.
83. Id. at art. 1.
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oversees the Demolition Bureau. Because of close relations between the
review entity and the Demolition Bureau, it is impossible to ensure
objectiveness in the reconsideration process. Second, the ARL requires
that only concrete administrative acts be reviewable. Residents have no
way to challenge abstract acts, such as the legality of local regulations,
rules and measures on which the forced eviction order was based. As a
result, frustrated residents have rarely taken their cases to the government
for administrative reconsideration.
As administrative reconsideration is unlikely to offer adequate
remedies, those determined to challenge an eviction order must pursue
administrative litigation in the courts. However, due to various constraints,
the courts are not immune from the influences of government officials on
behalf of developers or from developers themselves. Under the centralized
system, the courts in China are not an independent entity. Rather, they are
integral parts of the government, which are accountable to the
corresponding levels of government. The courts are dependent on the
government for funding and basic facilities such as court buildings,
computers and other necessities. Judges are elected by the corresponding
people's congresses, which, in fact, are controlled by the local party
committees and governments. Judges do not enjoy life tenures and are
treated the same as other government officials, who are elected or
appointed to their posts for five years but may be reappointed for an
additional term. Further, judges in the lower courts are often recent law
school graduates, largely directed and influenced by higher courts.
Therefore, judges are susceptible to various influences from party and
government officials. Because commercial developments are directly
beneficial to local leaders' political future and personal gain, they utilize all
disposable powers to clear the way for commercial development. For
example, in the Jiahe incident,85 the county government instructed the
county court to send over 200 judicial policemen to enforce eviction
orders. 6 In addition, lower courts are subject to directions from higher
courts. In 2003, the Guangxi High People's Court, Guangxi's Supreme
Court, issued an internal circular (also referred to as the No. 180 document)
requiring local courts not to hear a series of sensitive cases. The No. 180
84. Li Fuj in, Ma Liping & Guanyu Dui, "Renmin Fayuan Zuzhi Fa" Xiugai de Jidian
Sikao [Several Thoughts on Reform of the Law of P.R. C. Courts] at
<www.dffy.com/faxuejieti/zh/200311/20031118152714.htm> (visited July 23, 2005).
85. For details of the Jiahe incident, see Part II, B-i of this paper.
86. Wang Bin, Fayuan Bu Ying Chengwei Chaiqian de Maqianzu [Court Should not be
Involved in Illegal Demolition], ZHONGGUO JINGJI SHIBAO [CHINA ECONOMIC TIMES], (Dec.
22, 2004), available at <news.xinhuanet.com/house/2004-12/22/content_2365597.htm>.
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
document listed 13 types of sensitive cases that could cause class-action
lawsuits and social instability. Cases involving demolition and relocations
were third on the list.87 As a result of the judicial system's weak position in
the overall government structure, the effectiveness of seeking relief though
administrative litigation is very limited.88
According to the Administrative Litigation Law (ALL), courts can
only review the legality of concrete acts performed by governmental
89agencies. Courts have no power to review the appropriateness of an act.90
The law also provides that courts should not review general legislation,
such as administrative regulations, rules, and measures.91 In addition,
orders targeting indefinite groups or individuals are not reviewable. The
narrow scope of the ALL substantially discourages aggrieved residents
from challenging local normative documents that are inconsistent with
national laws. This limited scope allows governments the vast discretion to




Private homeowners and commercial developers multiplied at about
the same time the land and housing reforms began in China. This was the
intended result of the reformers. For the government, housing reforms
significantly relieved its burden of providing public housing to urban
87. Luo Changping, Guangxin Fayuan Xiawen Bu Shouli 13 Lei Anjian [Guangxi High
Court Required Lower Courts Not to Accept 13 Types of Cases], XN JING BAO [NEW
BEIJING NEWS], (Aug. 12, 2004), available at <www.china.org.cn/chinese/law/633142.htm>.
In the 1990s, Xiangshan Cement Factory (XCF) required employees to contribute savings to
the factory to help it out of economic depression. XCF promised to repay the contributed
capital with interests when its financial wellbeing improved. Several years later, however,
XCF was still in the economic quagmire due to poor management. In 2002, 150 workers
brought a class-action suit against XCF at the county court, claiming repayment of its debts.
Through court mediation, the case settled after XCF agreed to repay all its debts to the
employees. After discovering that XCF refused to honor the agreement, 60 workers
gathered in front of the county courthouse demanding enforcement of the settlement
agreement. The protest turned into a riot, which was highly publicized locally. The incident
seriously hurt the court's image. Against this backdrop, the High Court issued a circular
requiring local courts to accept sensitive cases.
88. See PEERENBOOM, supra note 24, at 420.
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residents. For residents, they provided an opportunity to own a home-a
dream quietly cherished by generations of Chinese. For developers, the
reforms created an unprecedented opportunity to profit from construction
projects. However, this seemingly win-win-win scenario soon met harsh
reality. Only a few years into the reforms, new homeowners found that
their properties were obstructions in the way of commercial development.
In the unbalanced tug-of-war between individual homeowners and deep-
pocketed developers, the government sided with the latter by changing
zoning plans to fit commercial development, authorizing forced evictions,
deploying judicial police to execute eviction orders, lowering compensation
standards, instructing courts not to hear cases involving demolitions,
blocking class actions, and more. Chinese scholars pointed out that "the
government has inappropriately become both a player and referee at the
same time."
92
The rationales for local governments giving commercial development
full support is invariably to reduce "transaction costs," increase local GDP,
and improve local image. Because transaction costs are often narrowly
construed as the sheer costs for developers, the value of private property is
left out of the equation. In the absence of a system of enforceable property
rights, powerless private owners are unfairly forced to bear the cost of
economic development.
What constitutes transaction costs for economic development? Part II
of this paper shows that the lack of protection for private property rights
results in several indirect transaction costs. The first cost is the residents'
loss of confidence in the government. Without strictly enforced zoning
plans and public consultations, virtually all residential houses are at risk of
being demolished for commercial development. Even developers
themselves are at risk of losing their investments if one day a better-
connected and more powerful developer enters the market requesting the
government exercise its eminent domain power. Lack of certainty and
predictability will discourage long-term investment and eventually hinder
economic development.
The second cost is the loss of momentum for building property law.
Building property rights is a systematic process. While legislative
activities are important, it is more important to create a climate in which
property rights are well respected. "For a new property to exist, the owner
92. Zhang Hui, Chaiqian Biancheng Raomin Gongcheng, Zhengfu Ying Zhuanxin
Danghao "Caipan Yuan" [Demolition Infringed Upon Private Property Rights;
Government Should Offer Protection], BEIJING WAN BAO (BEIJING EVENING NEWS], (Apr. 2,
2004), available at <news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2004-04/02/content1398552.htm>.
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
must possess 'the consent of fellow men to allow him to act in a particular
way. An owner expects the community to prevent others from interfering
with his actions, provided that these actions are not prohibited in the
specification of his rights.' 93 When a local government arbitrarily permits
forced evictions for commercial development, it sets a bad precedent, and
has a chilling effect on property ownership. It will take a long time and
extra effort to restore the social environment for property protection.
The third cost is the negative impact on law enforcement in general.
Without public representation and consultation, the decisions to grant
demolition licenses and forced eviction orders are often made in secrecy.
As a result, the enforcement of those orders has met furious resistance from
property owners. The disrespect of government action and police power
has a spillover effect, which has made normal law enforcement more
costly.
94
The fourth cost is the enlarged gap created between the rich and poor
as a result of demolition projects. Development projects often take place in
the center of downtown areas that are heavily occupied by low-income
residents. These so-called "golden spots" offer employment opportunities
to residents, especially laid-off workers. Residents often turn their
apartments into street-side shops to make a living. However, when these
buildings are demolished, the owners are only compensated under the
reduced residential price, rather than the commercial business price. This
is a major source of confrontation between residents and developers. The
new development actually further marginalizes those disadvantaged
groups. The enlarged gap between the rich and poor has given rise to a
host of social problems.
If the above factors are counted as transaction costs and reflected in
93. JEAN ENSMINGER, Changing Property Rights: Reconciling Formal and Informal
Rights to Land in Africa, in Drobak, supra note 21, at 165, 167-68 (quoting H. Demetz,
Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AMERICAN ECONOMIC REvIEw 347, 347 (1967)).
94. For example, on July 1, 2005, fourteen law enforcement officers in Chongqing were
burnt in a clash with the occupants of a temporary building undergoing demolition. Seven
of the officers were in critical condition. Unlike other commercial development
demolitions, this one was to clear the road blocked by the temporary building. The
occupants illegally erected the building on a sidewalk and refused to move. After several
notices, the government issued a forced eviction order. See Liu Zhan, Chongqing 14 Ming
Zhifa Renyuan Chaiqian Shi Beiren Yinran Qiyou Shaoshang [14 Law Enforcement Officers
Were Burned in the Process of Demolition], ZHONGGUO GUANGBO WANG [CHtNA
BROADCASTING NET], (July 1, 2005), available at <www.china.org.cn/chinese/
law/904368.htm>. See also, Zhang Rundong, Beijing Yi chaiqian hu yong liusuan Poshang
Chaiqian Renyuan 7 Ren ei Shaoshang [A Condemnee Poured Liquid Acid Onto Law
Enforcement Officers; Seven Officers Were Burned], JINGHUA SHIBAO [JINGHUA TIMES],
(June 21, 2003), available at <www.china.org.cn/chinese/law/3 50881 .htm>.
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the government's decision-making process, the developers are likely to find
that it is more costly to evoke the power of eminent domain than to
negotiate with owners on a consensus basis and purchase land-use rights
from the open market.
B. Informal Constraints
Based on New Institutional Economics, property rights are viewed as
institutions, which are composed of formal rules, informal constraints and
enforcement characteristics. In most cases, the three elements of the
institutions are not compatible with each other. As Dr. North observed,
"[w]hile the formal institutions may be altered by fiat, the informal
institutions are not amenable to deliberate short run change and the
enforcement characteristics are only very imperfectly subject to deliberate
control." 95 Therefore, a mere enactment of property law is unlikely to be
sufficient to offer adequate protection for private property rights. As
analyzed in this paper, the challenges facing the lawmakers in China are
not only how to formulate property rules, but, more importantly, how to
respond to and eventually alter the informal constraints that are hostile to
weak property owners.
While it is not perfectly clear how informal rules work in a formal
context, they do impose severe constraints on the ability to effectuate
changes. North and Thomas pointed out that "[p]roperty rights are always
embedded in the institutional structure of a society, and the creation of new
property rights, demands new institutional arrangements to define and
specify the way by which economic units can cooperate and compete., 96 In
order to reduce transaction costs in the development process and make
property rules effective, the following changes to informal rules are
necessary. First, the government's discretion in altering zoning plans and
authorizing takings must be restrained. This can be done by increasing
local congress' involvement and requiring public hearings. Second,
without independent appraisal, it is impossible to ensure just compensation.
Therefore, the ties between appraisal firms and developers must be cut off.
In order to do this, unethical appraisers must be held accountable. Legal
liability must be increased to deter false appraisals. Third, the state should
make efforts to promote judicial independence, which is essential for
limiting the opportunities for government to abuse its powers.
95. DOUGLASS C. NORTH, UNDERSTANDING THE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC CHANGE 157
(2005).
96. ENSMINGER, supra note 93, at 167 (quoting D.C. NORTH & R. THOMAS, THE RISE OF
THE WESTERN WORLD: A NEW ECONOMIC HISTORY, 5 (1973)).

